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Following the Rules:
Exclusion of Witnesses, Sequestration,
and "No-Consultation" Orders
Richard H. Underwoodt
Abstract
In this Article, Professor Underwood discusses the varying application
of Rule 615 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which provides for the
exclusion of witnesses. He explains that varying application ofRule 615
and state evidence rulesfollowing Rule 615's language creates misunder-
standings at trial. Thus, it is important to know not only the federal and
local rules but also the "way things are done" in a particular court.
"Separate these two far from one another that I may examine them."'
"'Gentlemen, that may be law in Philadelphia, but it [is] not law in Coosa-
whatchie."2
Introduction
We are supposed to follow the rules. Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 3.4(c) says so: "A lawyer shall not... knowingly disobey an
obligation under the rules of a tribunal, except for an open refusal based
on an assertion that no valid obligation exists.... ." And Federal Rule
of Evidence 615 provides that,
[a]t a party's request, the court must order witnesses excluded so that they
cannot hear other witnesses' testimony. Or the court may do so on its own.
I B.S. (1969), The Ohio State University; J.D. (1976), The Ohio State University
College of Law. Richard Underwood is the Spears-Gilbert Professor of Law at the
University of Kentucky College of Law, and a co-author of MODERN LITIGATION AND
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY HANDBOOK (2d ed. 2001), and TRIALETHICS (1988).
' Daniel 13:51 (New American Bible) (the story of"Susanna and the Elders"); see
Richard H. Underwood, The Limits of Cross-Examination, 21 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
113, 115 (1997).
2 JAMES PETIGRU CARSON, LIFE, LETTERS AND SPEECHES OF JAMES LouIs PETIGRU:
THE UNION MAN OF SOUTH CAROLINA 56 (1920), available at http://books.google
.com/books (search "Life, Letters and Speeches of James Louis Petigru"; then follow
"Life, letters and speeches of James Louis Petigru: the Union man of South Carolina"
hyperlink).
' MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(c) (2011).
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But this rule does not authorize excluding: (a) a party who is a natural
person; (b) an officer or employee of a party that is not a natural person, after
being designated as the party's representative by its attorney; (c) a person
whose presence a party shows to be essential to presenting the party's claim
or defense; or (d) a person authorized by statute to be present.
4
But following the rules is easier said than done. There are the rules
(both ethical and evidentiary), and then there are "the way things are
done." If you have not taken the time to find out how things are done,
you may get into trouble. I always make it a point to tell my students to
find out the local customs when venturing out into new territories (state
or federal)5 and ask questions when in doubt. Find out whether you are
supposed to stand or sit, and where. Read the local rules. If possible,
find out if the judge has any idiosyncrasies.' Do the judges and lawyers
in this new world into which you are venturing have their own lingo?
If you can help it, do not sound too foreign This Article addresses
4 FED. R. EviD. 615 (emphasis added). This Article does not address the application
of Rule 615 and problems of witness coaching and consultation in discovery and
pretrial proceedings. For guidance, see generally Jean M. Cary, Rambo Depositions
Revisited: Controlling Attorney-Client Consultations During Depositions, 19 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 367 (2006) (addressing the relationship between "no-consultation"
orders and client depositions); Michael D. Moberly, Can't we All Just Play by "The
Rule "? Sequestering Witnesses During Pretrial Discovery, 33 AM. J. TRIAL. ADVOC.
447 (2010) (addressing the relationship between pretrial discovery and sequestering
witnesses); Joseph R. W ilbert, Muzzling Rambo Attorneys: Preventing Abusive Witness
Coaching by Banning Attorney-Initiated Consultations with Deponents, 21 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1129 (2008) (addressing "the ethical implications of attempts to muzzle
witness-coaching Rambo attorneys").
' See United States v. Magana, 127 F.3d 1,5-6 (lst Cir. 1997) (A new prosecutor
was not familiar with the "longstanding custom" in the District Court relating to the
application of Rule 615.).
6 I remember one federal judge who not only locked the direct examiner to the
podium but also insisted that the opposing counsel get up and make it to the podium
to make objections. Needless to say, this can cause unnecessary injuries, and it also
cuts down on objections. The same judge thought it offensive for counsel to use the
usual foundation questions to set the witness up for impeachment with a prior incon-
sistent statement in a deposition. The judge had been a corporate lawyer, and secured
his appointment in the usual manner-senatorial campaign manager, or something like
that.
' For example, we do not say voir dire with a French accent, and we certainly do
not roll our "Rs." See Jeff Akins et al., Jury Selection and Voir Dire Examination in
Civil District Courts ofBexar County, SAN ANTONIO B. Ass'N, http://www.sabar.org/
displaycommon.cfm?an=1&subarticlenbr--55 (last visited Apr. 3, 2012).
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Federal Rule of Evidence 615. In my neck of the woods, if you want a
separation of witnesses, you say, "Your Honor, I move for the Rule."'
A puzzled look on your opponent's face tells the jury he is from out of
state-possibly "one of those people from Ohio."
What is the little problem with language when we are dealing with
Rule 615? The Rule says exclusion of witnesses.9 It does not say
sequestration of witnesses.'l As we shall see, many lawyers and judges
seem to think these terms mean different things." Other lawyers and
judges, and even treatise writers, use the terms interchangeably. 2 This
can lead to some unfortunate, and ugly, misunderstandings at trial. And,
misunderstandings can lead to distrust, which can hurt clients, and hurt
lawyers' reputations.
Barristers' Bad Hair Days
During the high profile terrorism trial ofZacarias Moussaoui, a lawyer
working for the Transportation Security Administration, who had been
assisting government trial counsel in arranging for the testimony of a
number of aviation security officials, provided trial transcripts of earlier
witness testimony, along with advice, to seven witnesses." This was
apparently in violation of the trial judge's order that not only excluded
witnesses from the courtroom but also prevented them from reviewing
' The "Rule" apparently comes from "The Rule on Witnesses," terminology that is
also used in Virginia, the source of many of our Kentucky expressions and practices.
Witness Guide, OFFICE OF THE COMMONWEALTH'S ATT'Y: LEE COUNTY, VA, http://
www.leecountyprosecutor.com/index.php?action=witness_guide (last visited Apr. 3,
2012).
9 FED. R. EviD. 615.
10 See id.
For an excellent student piece, see Sarah Chapman Carter, Comment, Exclusion
of Justice: The Need for a Consistent Application of Witness Sequestration Under
Federal Rule of Evidence 615, 30 U. DAYTON L. REV. 63, 72-90 (2004).
" See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVI-
DENCE § 6.108 (3d ed. 2010) ("In courtroom parlance, excluding or sequestering
witnesses is known as invoking 'the rule on witnesses."').
13 Stephen Labaton & Matthew L. Wald, Lawyer Thrust into SpotlightAfter Misstep
in Terror Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15. 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/15/
national/15 lawyer.html?_r- 1 &pagewanted=print (At that time, Carla J. Martin was a
fifty-one-year-old lawyer with experience in civil litigation defense.).
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transcripts of earlier testimony.' 4 The order specifically stated "that
'witnesses may not attend or otherwise follow trial proceedings (e.g., may
not read transcripts) before being called to testify."" '5 The trial judge,
Leonie M. Brinkema, penalized the government by barring the testimony
of the witnesses. 6 Legal pundits pilloried the unfortunate lawyer for the
blatant misconduct, 7 while opining on how they could have achieved her
goals without crossing the line, or at least not getting caught.'8 However,
her lawyer described her as being unfairly treated by fellow prosecutors
and "vilified" by the press.' 9 Time passed, and probably few people
noted that, after an investigation, the lawyer was not prosecuted. 20 It
seems that neither she nor her witnesses had been advised by the prose-
cution of the judge's order, which went beyond the literal language of
Federal Rule 615.21
Was this an unusual happening-an unfortunate misunderstanding
unlikely to come up in our practice? Guess again. The reader is probably
'4 See Labaton & Wald, supra note 13.
'5 Adam Liptak, Crossing a Fine Line on Witness Coaching, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16,
2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/16/national/16assess.html; see also Felicia
Carter, Current Development, Court Order Violations, Witness Coaching, and
Obstructing Access to Witnesses: An Examination of the Unethical Attorney Conduct
that Nearly Derailed the Moussaoui Trial, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 463, 465 n.17
(2007).
16 See Liptak, supra note 15.
'7 Ann Althouse, I Have Never Seen Such an Egregious Violation of a Rule on
Witnesses, ALTHOUSE BLOG (Mar. 13,2006, 11:28 AM), http://althouse.blogspot.com/
2006/03/i-have-never-seen-such-egregious.html; Shannon M. Awsumb, Avoiding a
Career-Ending Mistake, THE HENNEPIN LAWYER (Feb. 20, 2007), http://hennepin
.timberlakepublishing.com/article.asp?article = 1 099&paper= 1 &cat= 147; Lloyd de
Vries, Amateur Hour, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009, 6:42 PM), http://www.cbsnews
.com/2100-18567_ 162-1397691 .html (The government "cannot even follow simple and
fundamental trial rules that first-year law students are taught.").
"s See Liptak, supra note 15 ("Ms. Martin could have achieved much of what she
had set out to accomplish through more subtle, quite common and perfectly lawful
techniques.").
" Jerry Markon, Attorney Describes 9/11 Lawyer as 'Vilified', WASH. POST, Mar.
17,2006, http ://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/0 3/l 5/AR2006
031502656.html.
2 Michael J. Sniffen, Feds Decline to Prosecute Government Lawyer Who Coached
Moussaoui Witnesses, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 4, 2006.
21 See Carla Martin, WIKIPEDIA, http://www.ask.com/wiki/CarlaMartin (last
visited Apr. 4, 2012).
[Vol. 35:513
FOLLOWING THE RULES
aware of the recent second-degree murder conviction of University of
Virginia lacrosse player George Huguely for the beating death of fellow
athlete and sometime girlfriend Yeardley Love.22 According to ABC
News, Dr. Ronald Uscinski, the defense's neurosurgeon witness, was
precluded from offering important testimony because he had received
three emails from a member of the defense team that passed on certain
information relating to the testimony of the prosecution's medical witness
who had already testified.23 This was a rather startling application of the
"Rule on Witnesses" because expert witnesses are frequently allowed to
remain in court to assist counsel and hear the testimony of other wit-
nesses.
24
Bringing it All Back Home
As a professor at a state university, I am frequently asked to conduct
CLE presentations for the practicing bar. I am probably asked to conduct
them because I charge nothing and can usually get some laughs. I doubt
that the participants credit me with much in the way of expertise. Indeed,
I can expect a good portion of the audience to be hostile. I am not a "real
lawyer," and I do not know how it is done in "Coosawhatchie." Still,
conducting CLE presentations keeps me current and somewhat in the
loop.
22 Mary Pat Flaherty, Jenna Johnson & Justin Jouvenal, George Huguely Guilty of
Second-Degree Murder, WASH. POST, Feb. 22,2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/crime/george-huguely-guilty-of-second-degree-murder/20 12/02/21/
gIQA 1 ss4TRstory.html.
23 Christina Ng & Cleopatra Andreadis, George Huguely Trial: Defense and Prose-
cution Rest Their Cases, ABC NEWS (Feb. 18, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/US/
george-huguely-trial-defense-prosecution-rest-cases/story?id= 15744129; see also Colin
Miller, You've Got Mail: Trial Judge Applies "Rule on Witnesses " to Circumscribe
Defense Expert Testimony in Huguely Trial, EVIDENCEPROF BLOG (Feb. 20, 2012),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2012/02/you-may-have-heard-about-
the-current-prosecution-of-former-university-of-virginia-lacrsse-payer-george-
huguely-for-the-murd.html.
24 See Colin Miller, Is There a Doctor in the Courtroom?: Alabama Court Finds No
Problem with Prosecution Expert Hearing Defense Experts' Testimony, EVIDENCE-
PROF BLOG (Feb. 21,2012), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2012/02/
yesterday-i-postedan-entryabout-an-expert-defense-witness-not-being-allowed-to-
testify-concerning-certain-subjects-pursuant.html. Of course, in that case, it was the
prosecutions expert who was allowed to remain in the courtroom. My money would
be on a reversal of the Virginia verdict.
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Not long ago, I was on a trial ethics panel, which included a state
judge, a federal judge, and several practitioners. At the time, Iwas updat-
ing one of my books, and I made the mistake of bringing up Rule 615
and the fallout from the Moussaoui trial. I was actually interested in
finding out how the denizens of the local bar interpreted the Rule and its
application. I do not mind exposing my own ignorance. Admittedly, I
was not surprised by the fact that the federal judge and the local lawyers,
who mostly practice in the state courts, held very different views on the
subject, despite the fact that the text of the federal and state rules are
virtually identical.25 The federal judge took an expansive view of the rule
and his powers of enforcement. The practicing lawyers, on the other
hand, did not. I was also not surprised by the rather condescending
attitude of the "older" lawyers, who practice mostly in the state courts.
They knew what the Rule meant and were offended by my suggestion
that there may be varying interpretations of it and possible pitfalls asso-
ciated with it. Another issue that came up during our discussion of Rule
615 was the limitations on judges' power to prevent or limit counsel's
discussion of testimony with the client or witnesses at breaks during the
trial. Some participants seemed shocked that any limits might be imposed
and that I might suggest the possibility that such things happen.
Oh, well. It was not my first such experience. When I was Chairman
of the State's Model Rules Committee proposing the adoption of the
ABA Rules, I was accused of importing new rules that were contrary to
accepted traditions of advocacy, such as Rule 3.3(a)(2), which requires
a lawyer to "disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling
jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of
the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel, 26 and Rule 3.4(e),
which states that a lawyer should not inject "personal opinion" or belief.
27
My proposed, "new" rules were identical to the then-current code provi-
sions, but that fact did not seem to matter to the offended lawyers.
During a break, a member of the Kentucky Supreme Court (he is no
longer with us) actually accused me of "fraud" for suggesting that the
then-current version of the state's Code of Professional Conduct was
25 Compare FED. R. EVID. 615, with Ky. R. EvID. 615.
26 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(2) (2011).
27 Id. R. 3.4(e) (2011).
[Vol. 35:513
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actually consistent with the "new" and dreaded Rule 3.3(a)(3), which
provides that a lawyer must take "reasonable remedial measures" when
the lawyer knows the client has committed perjury.
28
More Confusion
I was gratified to later find that these same issues have also vexed at
least some "real lawyers" and judges.29 In a 2007 Symposium at
Georgetown University, Judge George W. Miller raised the same
questions:
[1]t is another example of an issue arising in connection with the study of
legal ethics that also has very practical consequences in the trial of lawsuits.
I have reference to what I would describe as "non-consultation" orders. That
is to say, in a trial, the court at the outset enters an order to the effect that
once a witness is seated there shall be no consultation between the witness
and counsel with regard to the substance of the witness's testimony .... I
wanted to take just a minute to read you one of my favorite transcript
excerpts dealing with a rule of the type I just described, which I announced
I was going to impose in a particular trial.
[At this point the Judge described a pretrial conference with opposing
counsel.]
The Court, "I think it was at least my intention to state that once the
witness takes the stand, that it would not be proper to discuss the substance
of his testimony during breaks or over the evening for that matter."
Plaintiff's Counsel responded, "The Court would preclude consultations
regarding the 'substance of [the witness's] testimony,' but that doesn't flow
from 615 .... "
The Court, "Yes, you're correct. That does not flow from 615. That's
another issue altogether."
28 See Richard H. Underwood, What I Think that I Have Learned About Legal
Ethics, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 245, 266-67 (2003) (discussing the author's experiences with
the Kentucky Model Rules Committee).
29 Symposium, Twenty Years of Legal Ethics: Past, Present, and Future, 20 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICs 321, 332-34 (2007) (quoting Hon. George W. Miller); see also 29
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 6246 (1997); Carter, supra note 11, at 72-90. See generally Kurtis A. Kemper,
Exclusion of Witnesses Under Rule 615 ofFederal Rules ofEvidence, 181 A.L.R. Fed.
549 (2002) (discussing the issues concerning Federal Rule of Evidence 615 in the
federal courts).
20121
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Government counsel, "That was my understanding, your Honor, and I'll
restate it if I could, just to make sure that I'm clear on it as well. That is,
under 615 the witnesses are sequestered and neither counsel nor the party's
representative can tell that witness and neither can the testimony, the
substance of testimony, be communicated either by sitting in the courtroom
or by communicating transcripts or by any other means, under 615. As to
a seated witness and communications between counsel and the seated
witness, it's my understanding that is something outside the scope of 615,
but that the ground rules for our trial are once the witness is seated, even if
trial ends for a break, for lunch, at the end ofthe day, that counsel may have
no substantive conversations, no conversations about the substance of the
testimony, the cross-examination that may be likely or about the case at all,
while the witness is seated and that is a second aspect ofthe communications
or limits on communications during the course of trial."
The Court, "I think that does state what I had intended to convey at the
pretrial conference."
Plaintiff's counsel, "Your Honor, I think that is problematic. I think it's
problematic in that to the extent that counsel is precluded from talking to
his witness not about testimony that has transpired but about future
testimony, future cross examination, that could be a denial of counsel and
a violation of due process. 3 °
Notice that there are two things under discussion here. First, government
counsel and the court, and maybe plaintiff's counsel, seem to be assuming
that an order separating the witnesses under Rule 615 prevents counsel
or other persons from conveying to a prospective witness the substance
of the testimony that has already been given by other witnesses in the
case. 3' That is not a universally recognized interpretation of Rule 615,
even in the federal courts, and is a potential source of misunderstanding.32
Second, government counsel and the court are saying that once a witness
is on the stand, counsel may not confer with the witness about the
substance of the witness's testimony, the likely cross-examination, or the
30 Symposium, supra note 29, at 332-33 (alteration in original) (emphasis added)
(quoting Hon. George W. Miller).
31 See id. at 333.
32 There is a massive A.L.R. annotation of the subject that collects the conflicting
precedents. See Kemper, supra note 29, § 2[a] (noting the different interpretations of
Federal Rule of Evidence among the federal courts of appeal); see also WRIGHT &
GOLD, supra note 29, § 6246 ("Exactly what is required by way of compliance is
largely determined by the precise wording of the order. However, the courts disagree
as to whether an order that on its face merely excludes witnesses from the courtroom
impliedly also precludes the witnesses from discussing the case outside court.").
[Vol. 35:513
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like.33 I gather that this is what the judge is referring to as a "non-
consultation" order.34 (Should it not be a no-consultation order? I prefer
that term.) The judge and the government counsel appear to be on the
same wave-length insofar as their local custom is concerned.35 The
plaintiff s counsel is perplexed.36 Again, this quarantine of a witness, not
to mention quarantine of a lawyer's client, is apparently not universally
accepted by lawyers.37 Both propositions would have shocked-indeed,
did shock-the lawyers on my CLE panel.
In some states, this is not the rule at all. For example, one Florida
judge recently opined that the Rule only prohibits "1) witnesses remain-
ing in the courtroom to hear the testimony of other witnesses; and 2)
witnesses discussing their testimony among themselves prior to testify-
ing."3 Florida courts do not prohibit lawyers from communicating with
witnesses during their testimony.39 On the other hand, the same judge
notes the the Florida equivalent of Federal Rule of Evidence 61 1,40 and
states that the trial judge has discretionary authority to prohibit lawyer-
witness consultations so long as the witness is not the criminal
defendant.4 ' That is to say that, although Federal Rule of Evidence 611
does not specifically prohibit lawyers from communicating with
witnesses during their testimony, it may be a source of authority to
support a specific "non-consultation" order preventing the practice. 42 Put
" Symposium, supra note 29, at 333 (quoting Hon. George W. Miller).
34 Id. at 332.
35 See id. at 333.
36 See id.
31 See id.
31 Judge Tom Barber, Restrictions on Lawyers Communicating with Witnesses
During Testimony: Law, Lore, Opinions, and the Rule, 83 FLA. B.J. 58, 59 (2009).
39 id.
40 Id. at 59. Compare FED. RULE OF EviD. 611, with FLA. R. EviD. 612.
41 Barber, supra note 38, at 60 (discussing constitutional limitations on trial judges'
common law authority).
42 See Minebea Co. v. Papst, 374 F. Supp. 2d 231, 233, 235 (D.D.C. 2005). Again,
federal trial judges have authority to add other restrictions to Rule 615, including an
order that witnesses may not converse with each other. See United States v. Magana,
127 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Arias-Santana, 964 F.2d 1262,
1266 (1st Cir. 1992)) (In fact, the district judge in the case assumed that counsel was
familiar with a "long standing" custom that was not included in the Rules or local
rules.).
2012]
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another way, "absent such an order from the trial court, there is nothing
in Florida law prohibiting lawyers from communicating with witnesses
during their testimony unless the communication constitute[s] coach-
ing. ' Judge Barber also notes that, even though Florida law does not
give a criminal defendant a right to discuss her testimony with counsel
while on the witness stand, Florida law goes even further than the United
States Supreme Court by allowing a criminal defendant to have access
to her counsel, "once a recess is called, no matter how brief."' However,
that is not the law in Coosawhatchie.45
I should also note that, while the federal trial judge in the Moussaoui
case had the authority to issue an order that went further than the literal
language of Rule 615,46 exclusion of witness testimony would not
necessarily have followed Fourth Circuit precedents.47
Back in Coosawhatchie Again
Naturally, a new development in our state law reinforces the rift
between federal and state practice. In a 2007 case, Woodward v. Com-
monwealth, the Kentucky Supreme Court, without any discussion of the
3 Barber, supra note 38, at 61.
"Id.; see also Leerdam v. State, 891 So. 2d 1046, 1049 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)
(quoting Amos v. State, 618 So. 2d 157, 161 (Fla. 1993)). In Perry v. Leeke, the
Supreme Court held that a prohibition on consultations during a fifteen-minute recess
between the direct and cross-examination of criminal defendant does not violate the
criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 488 U.S. 272,280-85 (1989).
For a case holding that a judicial order prohibiting consultation during a trial recess
violated a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, see Sanders v. Lane,
861 F.2d 1033, 1034 (7th Cir. 1988) (The court, nonetheless, found the error to be
harmless.). But cf. United States v. Sandoval-Mendoza, 472 F.3d 645,650-52 (9th Cir.
2006) (finding constitutional violation, but reversed on other grounds); Mudd v. United
States, 798 F.2d 1509, 1510-14 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (adopting a per se rule of reversal for
violations of a criminal defendant's constitutional right to counsel); United States v.
Romano, 736 F.2d 1432, 1438-39 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (finding reversible error based on
the "special facts of [the] case").
41 See Beckham v. Commonwealth, 248 S.W.3d 547, 553-54 (Ky. 2008). For a
critique of "non-consultation" orders and the United States Supreme Court precedents,
see Bennett L. Gershman, Judicial Interference with Effective Assistance of Counsel,
31 PACE L. REV. 560, 572-74 (2011).
46 See FED. R. EVID. 615.
41 See, e.g., United States v. Rhynes, 218 F.3d 310, 325 (4th Cir. 2000); see also
United States v. Washington, 653 F.3d 1251, 1268-69 (10th Cir. 2011).
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conflicting authorities on the subject, read Kentucky Rule of Evidence
615 literally. The court opined that the Rule requires only separation
of witnesses and not sequestration: "The rule makes separation in the
courtroom mandatory, but makes no mention of witnesses interacting
outside the courtroom. Obviously, the spirit of the Rule is not observed
when witnesses coordinate their testimony against a party. Unfortunately,
there is no practical means to ensure that this does not happen."'49 If there
appears to have been witness collusion outside the presence of the court,
"[t]he best course is to allow the testimony subject to proper impeach-
ment on cross examination."50  There was no discussion of orders
requiring more than that authorized by the literal language of Kentucky
Rule of Evidence 615 (perhaps under the authority of state Rule 611).51
Summing Up
It is not my intention to lecture anyone on how Rules 611 and 615
must be interpreted or applied, nor do I have a personal stake in the power
ofjudges to issue "non-consultation orders." Indeed, I am not generally
in favor of overly confining rules.52 I only wish to suggest that you
48 219 S.W.3d 723 (Ky. 2007), overruled on other grounds, Commonwealth v.
Prater, 324 S.W.3d 393 (Ky. 2010).
49 Woodward, 219 S.W.3d at 728.
"O Id. at 728-29. Cf State v. Silver, 3 Dev. 332, 14 N.C. 332 (1832). This case held
that the trial judge has discretion to allow witnesses to be reexamined at the request of
the jurors despite the fact that they have conversed together after their initial testimony.
This did not work out well for Frances (Frankie) Silver, whose appeal on this fine point
fell on deaf ears. She was hanged for the murder of her husband. He had been
dismembered, the body parts scattered and some burned in the fireplace. It was
probably a case of self-defense by an abused wife, and her family members probably
aided in her activities. But poor Frankie could not testify because in those days the
defendant was not deemed a competent witness. Apparently witnesses against her told
a more seamless story when recalled. Daniel was not there to help either. "Frankie
Silver" is a popular murder ballad, and her story is told in several recent works of
fiction and non-fiction. See, e.g., SHARYN McCRUMB, THE BALLAD OF FRANKIE
SILVER (1999) (fiction); PERRY DEANE YOUNG, THE UNTOLD STORY OF FRANKIE
SILVER (2012) (non-fiction).
51 See id. For a recent state case recognizing the discretionary power of the trial
judge, see State v. Copeland, 798 N.W.2d 250, 252-53 (Wis. Ct. App. 2011).
52 Some folks stretch this to the limit, and beyond. See John Steele, When Is
Informing a Witness of Facts Improper Witness Preparation?, LEGAL ETHICS FORUM
2012]
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRIAL ADVOCACY
should not make any assumptions about what the "real" rules are.
Furthermore, if you want separation, or something more than separation,
askfor it.53 Assume nothing. When in doubt about the local "understand-
ing," ask questions.
(July 14, 2011, 2:01 PM), http://www.legalethicsforum.com/blog/2011/07/when-is-
informing-a-witness-of-facts-improper-witness-preparation.html (noting that, in the
context of the "Fast and Furious" investigation, some members of Congress were
arguing that the DOJ was engaged in improper witness preparation by creating a
"database of documents and witness statements" that their witnesses could access).
" Marshall v. United States, 15 A.3d 699, 706 (D.C. 2011) ( "The federal courts
have consistently interpreted Rule 615 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to require a
party to request the sequestration of witnesses 'in order to claim any protection' from
the rule . . ").
[Vol. 35:513
